2009 ACM Electronic Commerce

Accepted Papers

Abstracts

Pricing Traffic in a Spanning Network
Herve Moulin, Rice University

Modeling Volatility in Prediction Markets
Nikolay Archak, New York University
Panagiotis Ipeirotis, New York University

But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?
David Rahman, University of Minnesota

Policy Teaching Through Reward Function Learning
Haoqi Zhang, Harvard University
David Parkes, Harvard University
Yiling
Chen, Harvard University

Eliciting Truthful Answers to Multiple-Choice Questions
Nicolas Lambert, Stanford University
Yoav Shoham, Stanford University

Computational Analysis of Perfect-Information Position Auctions
David Thompson, University of British Columbia
Kevin Leyton-Brown, University of British Columbia

A New Perspective on Implementation by Voting Trees
Felix Fischer, Ludwig-Maximilians University
Ariel Procaccia, Microsoft
Alex Samorodnitsky, Hebrew University

Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money
Ariel Procaccia, Microsoft
Moshe Tennenholtz, Microsoft

Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders
Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University

Social Lending
Ning Chen, Nanyang Technological University
Arpita Ghosh, Yahoo! Research
Nicolas Lambert, Stanford University

On the Complexity of Nash Dynamics and Sink equilibria
Vahab Mirrokni, Google
Alexander Skopalik, RWTH Aachen

Self-Correcting Sampling-Based Dynamic Multi-Unit Auctions
Florin Constantin, Harvard
David Parkes, Harvard

Managing the Quality of CPC Traffic
Bobji Mungamuru, Stanford University
Hector Garcia-Molina, Stanford University

An Exact Almost Optimal Algorithm for Target Set Selection in Social Networks
Oren Ben-Zwi, Haifa University
Danny
Hermelin, Haifa University
Daniel Lokshtanov, University of Bergen
Ilan Newman, Haifa University

Revenue Submodularity
Mukund Sundararajan, Stanford
Tim Roughgarden, Stanford
Shaddin Dughmi, Stanford

On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital Goods
Saeed Alaei, UMD-CP
Azarakhsh Malekian, UMD-CP
Aravind Srinivasan, UMD-CP

Crowdsourcing and All-Pay Auctions
Dominic DiPalantino, Stanford University
Milan Vojnovic, Microsoft Research Cambridge

On the Price of Mediation
Milan Bradonjic, Los Alamos National Labs
Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Kansas University
Adam Meyerson, UCLA
Alan Roytman, UCLA

A Unified Framework for Dynamic Pari-Mutuel Information Market Design
Shipra Agrawal, Stanford University
Erick Delage, Stanford University
Mark Peters, Stanford University
Zizhuo Wang, Stanford University
Yinyu Ye, Stanford University

Characterizing Truthful Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms
Moshe Babaioff, Microsoft Research
Yogeshwer
Sharma, Cornell University
Aleksandrs Slivkins, Microsoft Research

Substitutes or Complements: Another Step Forward in Recommendations
Jiaqian Zheng, Fudan University
Xiaoyuan Wu, eBay Research Lab
Junyu Niu, Fudan University
Alvaro Bolivar, eBay Research Lab

Designing Incentives for Online Question and Answers Forums
Shaili Jain, Harvard University
Yiling Chen, Harvard University
David Parkes, Harvard University

Destroy to Save
Geoffroy de Clippel, Brown University
Victor Naroditskiy, Brown University
Amy Greenwald, Brown University

The Adwords Problem:á Online Keyword Matching with Budgeted Bidders under Random Permutations
Nikhil Devanur, Microsoft Research
Thomas Hayes, University of New Mexico

The Price of Truthfulness for Pay-Per-Click Auctions
Nikhil Devanur, Microsoft Research
Sham Kakade, TTI Chicago

Limited and Online Supply and the Bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
Nikhil Devanur, Microsoft Research
Jason Hartline, Northwestern University

A Qualitative Vickrey Auction
Paul Harrenstein, University of Munich
Mathijs de Weerdt, Delft University of Technology
Vincent Conitzer, Duke University

Selling Ad Campaigns: Online Algorithms with Cancellations
Moshe Babaioff, Micosoft Research
Jason Hartline, Northwestern Univ.
Robert Kleinberg, Cornell University

The Price of Uncertainty
Maria-Florina Balcan, Microsoft Research
Avrim Blum, Carnegie Mellon University
Yishay Mansour, Tel-Aviv University and Google Research

Network Bargaining: Algorithms and Structural Results
Tanmoy Chakraborty, University of Pennsylvania
Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania
Sanjeev Khanna, University of Pennsylvania

Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms
Jason Hartline, Northwestern U.
Tim Roughgarden, Stanford U.

An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Itai Ashlagi, Harvard
Shahar Dobzinski, Hebrew University
Ron Lavi, Technion

The Price of Anarchy in Bertrand Games
Shuchi Chawla, Univ of Wisconsin Madison
Feng Niu, Univ of Wisconsin Madison

Bayes-Nash Equilibria of the Generalized Second Price
Renato Gomes, Northwestern University
Kane Sweeney, Northwestern University

Sybilproof Trust Exchange Protocols
Paul Resnick, University of Michigan
Rahul Sami, University of Michigan

Collective Revelation: A Mechanism for Self-Verified, Weighted, and Truthful Predictions
Sharad Goel, Yahoo! Research
Daniel Reeves, Yahoo! Research
David Pennock, Yahoo! Research

Social Influence and the Diffusion of User-Created Content
Eytan Bakshy, University of Michigan
Brian Karrer, University of Michigan
Lada Adamic, University of Michigan

Efficiency of (Revenue-)Optimal Mechanisms
Gagan Aggarwal, Google, Inc.
Gagan Goel, Georgia Tech
Aranyak
Mehta, Google, Inc.

Optimal Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification
Paolo Penna, UniversitÓ di Salerno
Carmine Ventre, University of Liverpool

On Representing Coalitional Games with Externalities
Tomasz Michalak, University of Liverpool
Talal Rahwan, University of Southampton
Jacek Sroka, University of Warsaw
Adrew Dowell, University of Liverpool
Micheal Wooldridge, University of Liverpool
Peter McBurney, University of Liverpool
Nicholas Jennings, University of Southampton